

### LEWICKI and RAIFFA

At the risk of sounding trite, I would posit that the Lewicki and Raiffa articles are, in style, complementary opposites. Both are primarily preoccupied with discussing the nature of coalitions. However, Lewicki's approach is definition-based: he spends most of the article describing the types and categories that various aspects of these coalitions fall into, whether that is categorizing the roles of different players, delineating types of power, or character of negotiating partners. In contrast, Raiffa spends a relatively short amount of time categorizing the various genres of multiparty negotiations, instead highlighting a series of potential problem areas and offers a framework and guidelines to circumvent or solve each.

Raiffa is a fine text to read for a negotiator heading into a multilateral negotiation over a specific, known issue. For example, handing the Raiffa article to the students of Processes of International Negotiation before they headed into their multiparty negotiation would give students a framework of techniques with which to approach and to which to apply the subject of the negotiations. But without this sort of ready, tangible example, Raiffa's article feels somewhat empty. For all of the instruction on who to put where, what sorts of subgroups to manage, and what sorts of efficiencies to maximize, there is little application and less proof that such management leads to anything but the existence of lots of infrastructure. In that vein, the Raiffa article is like a self-help book – lots of ideas, but little practical application and few promises that the ideas will stick. In contrast, Lewicki is choc-full of practical application. Lewicki presents practical models ranging in scope and application from a family quarrel to policy decisions of the European Union, and exhaustively defines the roles of all people. But, unlike Raiffa, one gets little guidance on how to create solutions to the problems he presents. In fact, one receives only seven general directives at the end of the article.

Thus, it seems that the Raiffa and Lewicki articles are most useful when applied together. But I couldn't help but notice that in certain places, the two authors seem to contradict each other. I was most taken with the apparent differences of opinion when it comes to advising on how to comprise and manage a coalition. Lewicki spends a good deal of time musing on the idea that strength is weakness, and vice-versa, in a multilateral negotiation. In Raiffa's model, however, the principal – that is a Lewicki term, incidentally – has a lot more designative power than he or she does in the Lewicki model. While Raiffa admits that there is room for the exchange of ideas, and that every party will likely be forced to compromise some dimension of its objectives in setting up a multiparty coalition, he also insists that a principal maintain a strict and selective hold

on who and how many people enter into a coalition. Lewicki seems to favor a much more organic approach, citing the merits of including small, willing, and somewhat disinterested parties.

It is difficult to say who is more correct. On certain matters, it seems that Lewicki is right in advising a principal to relinquish some sort of control. Doing so seems the best way to enlarge “the pie” beyond the original conception of cooperation. On certain matters it may also behoove a coalition to be as large as possible (certainly this is the case in bodies where a small percentage of dissent is an effective veto to any endeavor – it is better to take a chance that powerful allies may be brought into a coalition alliance via objectively less-powerful mutual friends than to risk forming no coalition – or one that is at the outset insufficient – at all). Yet, it is conceivable that for other endeavors – perhaps those in which actors are hoping to operate without attracting the sanction or attention of the greater international community – selectivity and secrecy are key, and Raiffa’s control-wielding principal is ideal. Each author presents plausible ways to organize a group around a goal.

The one thing, however, that neither of these articles addresses is what happens *beyond* the coalition. Setting up a coalition may be very important, and managing a coalition effectively is certainly a confusing task that requires the individuated attention of such scholars of negotiation, but neither of these articles communicates a concern for negotiations that must occur without as well as within a negotiation. On the global level, for instance, it seems that a coalition can never exist in an operational vacuum. A coalition’s acts, no matter how large the coalition, if it does not entirely and exhaustively include all parties at the international table, will incite ire and opposition, either from reluctant parties or those ideologically opposed to the activities of the coalition. And, with the ascent of non-state actors and non-governmental organizations, it is likely that such all-encompassing accords are impossible to achieve. While one might argue that this concern is moot, because the substance of Lewicki and Raiffa’s arguments for building contained groups may be extrapolated to apply to the greater international community “group” (for what is reaching an agreement globally but a larger-scale version of coalition-building), such an argument is rather implausible. Whatever the intra-coalition dynamics of any multilateral alliance, the overriding truth is that people approach a coalition because they are at least willing to consider cooperation on a specific issue, beyond the more general framework in which they exist (i.e. the UN, or some geographical region). Ultimately, the process that both Lewicki and Raiffa are describing is how a group of intended allies picks and refines its company line. At the point at which the coalition must confront the big bad world, including all of the parties that coexist in the same space but are not, for whatever reason, parties to the coalition, Lewicki’s and Raiffa’s scenarios fall short. For a coalition cannot, at that stage, because encapsulated in or

represented by a single agent effectively. The two spheres of negotiation – with partners and adversaries – exist at once, and in boiling down the nature of multilateral negotiations to its elements, Lewicki and Raiffa lose some of this complexity.